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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
NIELSEN V. PREAP1 
Plaintiffs challenged immigration authorities picking them up and 
detaining them without bond years after they had been released 
after serving criminal sentences.  Plaintiffs argued that the 
mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (8 U.S. C. § 1226(c)(2)) only applied at the 
time deportable aliens who had committed enumerated crimes 
were released from custody, and did not apply years later.  The 
Court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Act applies 
even if the individuals are not detained immediately after released 
from criminal detention. 
GARZA V. IDAHO2 
A criminal defendant in Idaho state court who had signed two plea 
agreements in which he expressly waived his right to appeal, 
subsequently informed his attorney that he wanted to appeal, but 
the attorney failed to file a notice of appeal.  Because of this, the 
defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings, but the state courts held that he could 
not show ineffective assistance of counsel as required under 
Strickland v. Washington.3  The Court held that a presumption of 
prejudice inheres whenever counsel fails to file an appeal when 
instructed regardless of whether he has signed an appeal waiver. 
CULBERTSON V. BERRYHILL4 
An attorney successfully won four denials of social security 
disability claims in court, but the court capped his fee for both the 
court and underlying administrative proceeding at “25 percent of 
1. No. 16-1363, slip op. (Mar. 19, 2019).
2. 139 S.Ct. 738 (2019).
3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
4. 139 S.Ct. 517 (2019).
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the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant [was] 
entitled” pursuant to the Social Security Act.5  The attorney 
petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that the cap applied solely 
to his court-related fees.  The Court held that the 25 percent of 
past-due benefits cap on attorneys’ fees applies only to court 
representation and not to an aggregate of court and administrative 
proceedings. 
TIMBS V. INDIANA6 
Petitioner pleaded guilty to drug distribution charges and was 
sentenced to one year of home detention and five years of 
probation.  The Indiana court also ordered the forfeiture of this 
Range Rover, valued at four times the maximum fine for his 
offenses.  He challenged this under the Eight Amendment’s 
excessive fines clause. The Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause incorporates the 
Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause against the states. 
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